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A. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
Computer information systems have given us the ability to
process vast amounts of information; however, intrusion by a
computer virus can cause tremendous damage to the information
stored in them. Viral attacks can be insidious and can cause
destruction in alarming proportions. Recovery or replacement
of damaged information may take several years. The number of
viruses has dramatically increased since 1988 when there were
only five known major computer viruses, now there are over
323. Computer viruses have also become much more sophisticated
in their methods of attack, frequently secreting themselves in
nonvolatile memory, thus making system reinfection an
increasing problem [Ref.17]. Additionally, the number of
personal computers connected to both local and wide area
networks has significantly compounded the problem since
viruses can rapidly infiltrate these networks and cause near
catstrophic damage. As a result of this rapidly growing
threat, computer viruses have become one of the primary
concerns to information system managers due the potential
damage they may inflict.
Computer information systems can be managed to prevent and
minimize the damage to information that can result from
computer viruses. The National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) stated that a lack of virus awareness by-
users, absence or inadequate security controls, ineffective
use of existing security controls, bugs and loopholes in
system software and unauthorized use were responsible for the
increased damage to information systems by viruses
[Ref . 16 :p. 113] . Through the use of better management
techniques and increased security awareness, managers can
ensure adequate safeguards are in place to protect their
systems from the threat of computer viruses [Ref . 19 :p. 384]
.
Information system users should have a basic understanding of
the types of viruses and their characteristics since viruses
can infect computer systems in a variety of ways.
Over the last two decades the Navy has become more
dependent on computer information systems to process both
classified and unclassified information. Therefore, in order
to properly protect this information, Information Systems
users in the Navy must have a complete understanding of the
methods for the prevention, detection, and treatment of
computer viruses. By establishing proper operating
precautions, using anti-virus programs, and training the
Navy' s Information System users in anti-viral countermeasures,
information systems can function in a safer operating
environment, thus enhancing the overall Information Security
posture in the Department of the Navy.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the
susceptability of DON information systems to computer viruses
and answer the following questions:
a. What is the security threat from computer viruses?
b. What are the different types of computer viruses?
c. What type of damage is caused by viral infection?
d. What are the current methods used for the detection,
prevention and treatment of computer virus infections?
e. How should the Department of the Navy be organized to
combat the threat posed by these viruses?
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To answer the proceeding questions a review of existing
literature concerning computer viruses was conducted in order
to, determine the overall threat posed by computer viruses,
examine current methods for their detection, treatment and
prevention, and review organizational policies and structures
designed to combat the threat posed by the computer virus
problem. Relevant DoD and DoN instructions were thoroughly
examined in order to determine if existing organizational
policies and structures were adequate for the proper
protection of the Navy's Information Systems. Interviews with
several security experts from within DoD and DoN were
conducted in order to examine possible alternative policies,
organizational structures and methods for increasing the
Navy's effectiveness combating the computer virus problem.
This thesis focuses on viruses generally associated with
personal computer systems and PC based local area networks.
However, the policies, guidelines and organizational measures
presented in this paper are applicable to larger computer
systems and networks. Chapter II of this thesis provides a
brief history of computer viruses and the damage caused to
information after their intrusion on computer systems. Also
three case studies are examined in order to develop a greater
appreciation of the virus threat. Chapter III examines the
various types of viruses, their characteristics and how they
are catagorized. It also explores the different methods of
attack use by viruses when invading computer systems. Chapter
IV outlines DOD and DON security guidelines for ADP systems.
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations resulting
from this study. Finally, Appendix A, B, and C provide
detailed imformation on current techniques used in the
detection, treatment and prevention of computer viruses.
II. THE VIRUS THREAT
A. HISTORY OF COMPUTER VIRUSES
A computer virus is a program that can infect other
programs by modifying them to include a copy of itself
[Ref .32] . A virus differs from other programs in that it can
reproduce itself and spread quickly throughout a computer
system resulting in damage to software and information
[Ref .15:p. 104]
.
Most people believe that computer viruses emerged shortly
after the beginning of the personal computer era (post 1970)
.
However, computer viruses have been in existence since the
late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1949, John von Neumann
presented a model of a computer program to support his theory
that computer programs could replicate themselves [Ref.
ll:p.23]. Subsequently, about ten years later, H. Douglas
Mcllroy, Victor Vysottsky, and Robert Morris, while employed
as computer programmers for Bell Labs, developed a number of
computer programs (later named 'organisms') that could
reproduce themselves as a part of a computer game in which
these organisms were turned loose into the computer's memory.
The objective was to destroy each others program and the
player with largest organism at the end of game was declared
the winner. This game was named "Core Wars" and soon spread to
organizations such as the Xerox Research Center in Palo Alto,
California and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
"Core Wars", was a closely guarded secret until 1984, when the
recipe for the "Core Wars" virus was made public
[Ref .ll:p.24]
.
After "Core Wars" made its debut on computer systems,
numerous similar programs began emerging. The majority of
these programs did not cause any harm to the computer systems
but were able to enter system memory and display messages on
a terminal's screen. By the mid-1970s, much literature was
introduced, both fiction and non-fiction, on the subject of
computer viruses. Thomas Brunner's 1975 novel, "Shockwave
Rider" featured worms and viruses as coded creatures
[Ref . 11 :p . 25] . A novel named "The Adolescence of P-l by Thomas
J. Ryan" told of an intelligent, information-seeking virus.
The rapid developments in computer communications and
computer networks has magnified the threat of computer viruses
by enabling them to travel over greater distances causing not
only local damage but global damage as well. In 1982, the
Because It's Time Network (BITNET) reported a virus which
infected the network and caused damaged to certain graphic
games and another incident in 1988 displayed "BOO!" on user
terminals [Ref . 11 :p . 30 ] . Although the virus incidents
described above appear to be minor, there have been several
other incidents in which viruses caused enough damage to
justify prosecution of the perpetrator on criminal charges. By
the late 1970s and early 1980s, several incidents involving
computer viruses began to surface which seemed to indicate
that viruses were now causing severe damage to information
resources and that serious measures needed to be taken to
protect computer systems from their invasions. A UNIX based
virus released by Robert Morris Jr. rapidly spread to computer
systems located throughout the United States, by infecting
several networks. As a result of the damage inflicted by his
virus, Morris was prosecuted on criminal charges. Another
case, also resulting in prosecution on criminal charges,
involved a student attending Chisholm Institute of Technology
in Australian who released a massive virus attack on the
school's computer systems [Ref . 13 :p . 554 ] . Chisholm Institute
of Technology' s computer systems were hit by a virus known as
the "New Zealand" virus which resulted in massive damage to
organizational data and information. An investigation into the
incident revealed that Deon Barklak of North Caufield,
Melbourne, was responsible for the virus. He was prosecuted on
charges of computer trespass and criminal damage. Viruses have
struck systems in the United States, Irael, China, Pakistan,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada taking advantage of
loopholes in network software and relaxed security procedures.
B. DAMAGE CAUSED BY VIRUSES
Computer viruses are causing damage to information in
alarming proportions. As a nation we have become increasingly
more dependent on automated data processing systems to perform
a variety of tasks which were traditionally done by people in
the past. However, this change has not been without some risk.
Since the potential for damage to computer processed
information has intensified over the years. Virus intrusion
into computer systems has been responsible for significant
damage to information and software programs.
On a near daily basis, there is an incident being reported
in which a computer virus has infected a computer system and
has caused prolonged system downtime and destroyed programs or
data, resulting in lost man hours, unscheduled system cleanup
costs and expensive installation cost associated with improved
security measures
.
American entrepreneurs have grown dependent on automated
processing as have many other research and science
institutions, military organizations, educational
establishments, and health care services. One of the most
serious effects of a computer virus is the negative impact it
can have on the effectiveness of an organization which relies
on computer services to process data or information. A
successful virus can penetrate the security system of an
online computer and attach itself to the operating system, or
other programs resident in the memory, and consequently
destroy years of data and information which is pertinent to
the operation of the organization. Not only is the
organization' s ability to function routinely impaired but the
8
organization must also bare the financial costs associated
with restoring the system, conducting an investigation, and
initiating legal proceeding against the perpetrator. The legal
system is currently creating laws and punishment to fit these
crimes to attempt to deter the so called "hacker" from
disrupting businesses and other organizations from carrying
out their tasks through the use of computer systems.
C. CASE STUDIES INVOLVING COMPUTER VIRUSES
Described below are three of several reported cases where
a computer virus have been known to infect a computer system
and caused significant damage to information and its
resources
.
1 . The Internet Worm Incident .
On 2 November 1988, the wide area network known as
"Internet" came under attack by a viral program which later
became known as the Internet Worm because of its ability to
run independently and propagate a fully working version of
itself to other machines. The program, released from Cornell
University, could be classified as an information seeking
program since it collected host, network, and user information
which it later used to penetrate network connections thereby
gaining access to other computer systems in the network. Once
in the network, the program would replicate itself and infect
other systems in the same manner. The program specifically
targeted Sun 3 and VAX computer systems running variants of 4
BSD UNIX. The virus program spread rapidly by exploiting some
of the weaknesses of the UNIX operating system. The primary
method of attack of the Internet Worm was to discover user
passwords by using lists of words, including the standard
online dictionary, as potential passwords. It then used a fast
password algorithm to compared the result against the contents
of the systems' password file. The Worm successfully exploited
the accessibility of the user password file coupled with the
tendency of users to choose common words as their password.
Reports reveal that nearly fifty percent of the passwords were
broken. Finally, unusual files were inserted in directories of
some machines and strange messages appeared in log files of
system utility programs. The most recognizable affect of the
Internet Worm was that the systems became heavily bogged down
by executing processes which were repeatedly infected by the
worm. Eventually, the systems failed completely because their
swap space and process tables were totally exhausted.
On 3 November 88, personnel located at the University
of California at Berkeley and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology captured copies of the program for analysis. One of
the interesting features observed was the program' s ability to
utilize and tamper with system' s resources without easily
being detected. Shortly thereafter, researchers at Berkeley
developed a set of procedures to prevent further attacks by
the program which included software patches to loopholes in
system and network connection software. Later, an
10
investigation was launched to determine the cause of incident
and who was responsible. Subsequently, the New York Times
identified Robert T. Morris as author of the Internet Worm.
2 . The Virus That Went Around The World
At 10:00 on October 7, 1988, Princeton University
reported that it needed assistance in combating the nVIR virus
which was infecting Macintosh computers located at the
university's computer center. Three hours later, Stanford
University reported similar problems with its Macintosh
computers. In this short three hour period, the nVIR virus had
traveled 3000 miles. One week later, the same virus infected
computers located at Oulu University near the Artie Circle in
Finland. Further reports from several Southeast Asian
countries indicated that they too had also encountered the
nVIR virus.
The nVIR was first discovered in Germany in early
1988. One individual who found the virus on his system
disassembled the program code and published its source code on
a bulletin board. The original virus and its mutations vary in
the messages they displayed but strictly targeted Macintosh
terminals- (some of the messages were "Don't Panic!" or
"Welcome to the Mac World") . The virus and its mutants also
varied in the action taken after initial infection. Some
variants caused the system to crash after an infected program
was invoked, however some mutations merely clogged the system
by indicating that there was insufficient memory to execute
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the requested program. Other variants of the virus caused
systems to automatically lock up, requiring repeated reboots.
Werner Uhrig of the University of Texas at Austin created a
public domain program named "KillVirus" designed to clean up
systems infected by the nVIR virus. Shortly thereafter, a
commercial product Virex (HJC Software) was created that would
detect and remove any new strains of nVIR virus [Ref . 20 :p. 10]
.
3 . Viruses at the University of Delaware
The University of Delaware came under attack by two
viruses known as the "Brain" virus and the "Scores" virus.
These viruses were discovered by lab personnel located at
several microcomputer labs throughout the campus.
a. The "Brain" virus was first reported by the lab
staff in the main library's microcomputing laboratory when
responding to numerous complaints by students of retrieving
files on what appeared to be undamaged diskettes. When using
the DOS command "CHKDSK", the lab staff found an unusual
volume label "Brain" along with 3072 bytes in three bad
sectors on several disks. Follow on analysis using Norton
Utilities indicated that these disks had the following message
in the boot sector of the disk:
"Welcome to the Dungeon. Copyright 198 6 Basit &
Amjad (pvt) Ltd. Brain Computing Services 730 Nizam Block
All am Lahore Pakistan "BEWARE OF THIS VIRUS CONTACT US FOR
VACCINATION." [Ref . 2
:
p . 2 84 ]
.
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The original version of the Brain virus changed the
contents of the boot sector, which is reserved for the
operating systems files with the above message. The virus was
able to hide in the three sectors by labeling them as bad
sectors [Ref . 2 :p . 284]
.
The "Brain" virus is activated when the computer
is booted with an infected diskette and remains resident in
memory until the system is shutdown. When the operator is
using application software, such as WordPerfect or Windows,
the virus or the application issues a file save command and
subsequently the application communicates the request to the
operating system which is infected by the virus code,
initiates an I/O interrupt. Instead of pointing to the
location in RAM where the data is to be saved, the virus
program is flagged and then transferred to the target
diskette. The "Brain" virus then destroys information and
files by writing bad sectors to the file allocation table
(FAT) . In the case of a DOS-bootable disk, the virus can now
infect others disks used to boot up the computer system
[Ref .2:p.284]
.
Before being brought under control, the "Brain"
virus infected more than fifty percent of the main library'
s
software programs and approximately five percent of other lab
software. As a result, lab personnel were operating on
overtime checking software packages and hard disks for any
signs of possible infection. Additionally, several labs were
13
closed for approximately two days in order to eliminate the
virus thus denying services to students and faculty
[Ref .2:p.284]
.
b. A second virus that travelled rapidly throughout
the University of Delaware was discovered in the Macintosh
labs. Faculty and students using the systems began
experiencing crashes while using the program MacWrite, MacDraw
and Excel. Investigation into the cause of the problem
revealed a dog-eared icon and hidden files named "Scores" and
"Desktop" located on the suspected disks.
The "Scores" virus was created to target two
proprietary software packages named ERIC and VAULT at
Electronic Data Services Inc.. Supposedly, "Scores" was
designed to crash these specific programs without destroying
data or program files, nor was it intended to make contact
with the outside world [Ref . 2 :p . 249] . The virus code was
passed from one Macintosh to another by infected application
programs. In the programs initialization code, the virus
attached itself to the Macintosh operating system by adding
unseen files to the system's folder. When the system was
booted up, the virus loaded itself into RAM and searched for
uninfected programs . When the virus located an uninfected
program, it inserted itself into the application. A modified
pointer in the software jump table would then direct the
program to jump to the virus program during execution. The net
effect was sluggish program performance and occasional program
14
crashes due to random interrogation of the program
Input/Output (10) functions [Ref . 2 :p. 285] .
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III. TYPES OF COMPUTER VIRUSES
A. METHODS OF VIRUS ATTACKS
A computer virus can attack any form of writable storage
such as hard disk, floppy disk, tape, optical media, or
memory. Infection occurs rapidly when the computer is booted
from an infected disk or when an infected program is executed.
Viruses are successful using a variety of techniques to
remain in the memory of computers after its code has been
executed and their host program has terminated [Ref . 12 :p . 36]
.
Once a single infected program has been executed, the virus
will begin to spread to other programs in the system. This
spreading occurs until the system is rebooted to clear the
virus from memory.
If additionally, the virus remains resident in memory and
continues to affect other programs, it usually also infects
the standard interrupts used by DOS and BIOS so that it is
invoked by other programs when they make service requests
[Ref . 12 :p. 38 ] . When an interrupt is called, the operating
system can execute the subroutine whose contents are located
in the vector or interrupt table. This table contains
pointers to routines in the Read Only Memory (ROM) or the
Random Access Memory (RAM) of the operating system. A virus
16
can alter the contents of this table so that the interrupt
results in an execution of the main viral code segment.
A common technique used by the virus is trapping the
keyboard interrupts in order to intercept the CTRL-ALT-DEL
soft reboot command, modify user keystroke or invoke various
action dependent upon specific individual or sequence of
keystrokes [Ref . 12 :p. 39]
.
Viruses are also capable of invading the BIOS disk
interrupt and can therefore initiate damage to the disk boot
sector, or disguise disk accesses in order to infect other
disks request. Viruses have also been known to interrupt all
DOS service requests including program execution, disk access,
and memory allocation. In other words, a well devised virus
can completely take over the computer and all of its
activities thus rendering the user helpless.
When a virus infects a system, it passes through two
phases which are the "Action" and "Replication" phases. The
action phase is triggered by a certain event such as a date or
time according to the system's clock. Once the virus is
activated it generally does not damage the system immediately
rather it will grow, replicate and spread throughout the
system then it will begin damaging files, programs and storage
media [Ref. 22]
.
Computer viruses infects program code files by inserting
their own code in such a way that the viral code is executed
17
before the infected host program [Ref . 12 :p. 36] . Usually,
viruses come in the following two variants:
• Overwriting: This occurs when the virus writes it code
directly over the host program, completely destroying
all of its code. The host program will not execute
correctly as result of infection [Ref . 12 :p. 36]
.
• Non-overwriting: This happens when the virus relocates
the host program code leaving the code intact and the
host program code can execute normally [Ref . 12 :p. 36] .
Overwriting viruses are the easiest types of viruses to
create. The distinguishing feature of this type of virus is
its complete destruction of the program code of the host
program of which it infects. An overwriting virus should be
quickly noticeable to the user, however, most often, users
mistake the effects as hardware related because no errors
messages appear on the screen [Ref . 21 :p. 184]
When a system has been infiltrated and infected by an
overwriting virus, the virus prevents generation of error
messages from the carrier program when it is activated. The
virus part of the carrier program is processed first which in
turn activates the virus kernel enabling it to infect and
destroy other programs [Ref . 21 :p. 185]
.
The virus then begins to search the system' s hard drive
for executable programs . Once it locates a program, it is
loaded into memory and the virus checks the program to see if
it contains a marker byte (indicating the program has been
infected) at the start of the program. If a marker byte is
located, the virus continues its search until it encounters a
18
program not containing a marker byte. The victim program is
then overwritten by replacing the original program code with
the virus code segment [Ref . 21 :p . 184]
.
Non-overwriting viruses are considered a more dangerous
variant of computer viruses. The distinguishing feature of
these viruses is that they are usually not interested in
destroying the infected programs but are often active in the
computer system for years without the user being aware of it.
As we have learned from the overwriting virus, errors and
problems are caused as soon as they are activated and they
immediately begin to replicate themselves. This is not the
case in the non-overwriting virus. The user usually cannot
detect the presence of these viruses because the telltale
symptoms that appear in overwriting viruses do not appear when
a non-overwriting virus is executed. Non- overwriting viruses
are similar to overwriting viruses in construction except for
the addition of a MOV routine. Like the overwriting virus, the
non-overwriting also contains a marker byte, virus kernel, and
manipulation task. MOV represents the move routine for program
regeneration [Ref . 21 :p. 188]
.
An operating characteristic of the non-overwriting virus
is that an infected carrier program is also used, however, the
important difference is that all infected programs can be
carrier programs and they function without causing errors.
Non-overwriting viruses search the hard drive for executable
programs and once it locates a program without a marker byte,
19
the infection process begins using the same procedures as in
the case of overwriting viruses but it also inserts a MOV
routine in the jump table. The MOV routine performs a jump to
the start of a program, where the infected program now runs
without error [Ref . 21 :p. 189]
.
Another type of computer virus to beware of is referred to
as a "Memory Resident Virus". This type of virus differs from
the "Overwriting" and "Non-Overwriting" viruses in that after
a memory resident program is loaded, it remains resident in
memory until the system is either turned off or rebooted. Once
specific conditions have been met, the virus program can be
activated at any time. This may occur through an interrupt or
a call from another program which activates the virus program.
The virus first replicates and then performs manipulation
tasks, creating the appearance of normal operation
[Ref . 21 :p . 191 ] . Other common viruses are:
- Hardware viruses - viruses which are placed in the
computer by modifying the hardware (most frequently these
hardware modifications are found in ROM) [Ref . 21 :p. 197]
.
• Buffered viruses - viruses which install themselves in a
RAM buffer and exhibit characteristics similar to hardware
viruses [Ref . 21 :p . 197 ]
.
• Live and die viruses - viruses which are activated in
computer systems for a certain period of time. When that
time has expired, they remove themselves from the infected
software [Ref . 21 :p . 197 ]
.
• Hide and seek viruses - viruses which are activated for a
length of time in a computer system and then hide in
places such as buffer areas of intelligent terminals or
modems [ Re f . 2 1
:
p . 1 97 ] .
20
B. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION
Programs that infect other programs are usually one of the
following categories: Trojan horses, Worms, and Viruses.
Trojan horses appear to be normal programs but they can
place messages on the terminal, execute bomb programs, or
erase information. They also can shuffle data around or slip
it out of software trapdoors. Trojan horses do not replicate
themselves nor contaminate other programs and are therefore
not considered true viruses. There damage is local and they
can be easily eliminated, usually by deleting the infected







ALTCTRL.ARC Execution will result in damage
to boot sectors.
12 3JOKE Rewrites the hard drive sectors
ANALYZE.EXE Destroys the FAT of the hard drive
ARC513.EXE Destroys track of the floppy or
hard drive.
BALKTALK Destroys sectors on the hard drive
BXD . ARC Deletes the FAT of the hard disk.
DEFENDER. ARC Writes to ROM and formats the hard
drive
.
DISCACHE.EXE Directs BIOS routines to write to
the hard drive and destroys the
FAT
Worms are similar to viruses in that they are not
constructive and also may create replicas of itself. They are
independently operating programs that attempt to actively
propagate themselves and their replicas throughout the
network. Worms will try use the resources of the host machine
in order to penetrate and gain access to a network. An example
of a worm was the "Internet Worm", discussed in chapter 2,
which was able take advantage of loopholes in the Unix
22
operating system and spread rapidly throughout various
computer networks
.
Computer viruses are classified by the way they gain
access to or the type damage they cause in the computer
systems. Viruses consist of those programs that reside on a
host with purpose of infecting files and possibly disrupting
the host machine. Viruses can be classified by the files they
infect
r
the size in bytes, and the signature byte (shown as
two byte hexadecimal codes) [Ref . 21 :p. 74] . An example of this




















Tiny COM 163 1285F362915F145
25547
McAfee Associates, a well known maker of virus detection
software has listed over 300 of the current PC viruses in
alphabetical order and uses a sequence of codes which




Table 3.3 is an example of a short list depicting how



































1 - Virus uses stealth technique
2 - Virus uses self-encryption
3 - Memory resident
4 - Infects COMMAND.COM
5 - Infects COM files
6 - Infects EXE files
7 - Infects overlay files
8 - Infects floppy boot sector
9 - Infects hard disk partitions sector
A - Infects all programs
B - Corrupts or overwrites the boot sector
24
D - Corrupts data files
F - Formats or overwrites all/part of disk
L - Directly or indirectly corrupts file linkage
- Affects system run-time operation
P - Corrupts programs or overlay files
For example, from Table 3.3, we can determine that the
Chaos virus uses self encryption (2), infects Command.COM (4)
and infects all .COM files (5) . In addition, it corrupts or
overwrites the boot sector, affects system run time operation,
corrupts data files and formats all or part of the disk. M-
Disk is the preferred method to eradicate Chaos from the
computer system. The McAfee Associates updates the virus list
periodically to indicate new strains of reported viruses along
with any newly detected viruses.
The above classification methods are just of few examples
of several virus classification methods available on the
market. These classification techniques attempt to define and




IV. DOD/DON POLICIES AND GUIDELINES ON AIS SECURITY
A. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING DIRECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
In 1972, the Department of Defense published an
Instruction entitled "Security Requirements for ADP Systems"
(DODINST 5200.28). This instruction outlined requirements for
DOD organizations to provide for the safeguard of new
information resources. Subsequently, in 1982, the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV) produced and promulgated its first
instruction, the "ADP Security Manual". All commands in the
Navy were mandated to comply with the requirements of the "ADP
Security Manual". Local commands were required to develop
instructions and policies conforming to the manual and
designated an ADP Security Officer to manage security issues
involving computer systems.
To assist commands throughout the Department of the Navy,
the Navy Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) began publishing
advisory bulletins which were instrumental in assisting Navy
commands with ADP security issues. Early problems surfaced
during the initial implementation of these instructions due to
the terminology applied to ADP equipment. As a result,
operators of microcomputer were uncertain if their equipment
were considered ADP equipment and subject to this new policy.
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NAVDAC attempted to clarify the definition of ADP equipment in
one of its bulletins as:
• "Instruction 5239. 1A applies to all ADP equipment within
the activity not just the computer room. Memory
typewriters
,
word processors, micro computers and
computers in support of numerical control programming are
some of the equipment... that is covered by 5239. 1A."
In an effort to refine some of the advances made in
computing covered in its instruction of 1972, DoD reissued
5200. 2B in March of 1988 and the term AIS (Automated
Information Systems) was adopted in favor of ADP.
The overall guidance for the Department of the Navy for
computer security is the "Department of the Navy Automated
Information Systems Security Program (SECNAVINST 5239.2). The
purpose of which is to provide the framework for Navy and
Marine Corp organizations to establish AIS security programs.
It defines an organization structure, sets forth the policies
and principles of security for computer systems, both
unclassified and classified, required for effective
implementation in the Department of the Navy. The objective of




• "To ensure the availability of reliable information and
automated support required to meet the Department's
mission by adequately protecting all automated
information systems, networks and computer resources
against accidental or intentional destruction,
unauthorized disclosure, denial of service and
unauthorized modification. This objective will be met by
ensuring that countermeasures provided by physical,
administrative and operational procedures, personnel,
communications, emanations, hardware, software and data
security elements are collectively adequate to protect
against such events as material hazards, fire, misuse,
espionage, sabotage or malicious acts".
This instruction mandates that all navy activities and
sponsored contractors, who control and/or operate AISs on the
Department of Navy premises, are required to have in placed a
security program that adheres to guidelines contained therein.
SECNAVINST 5239.2 provides general information on program
accreditation, policy, certification, and risk assessment
along with formal authority to appoint a Designated Approving
Authority (DAA) that a system is safe to operate in a
particular security environment satisfying program
requirements [Ref.25]. Most often DAA responsibilities rest
with the commanding officer unless otherwise designated by
higher authority.
Of the seven program elements indicated in SECNAVINST
5239.2 which are Information Security, AlS/Computer Security,
Communications Security, Personnel Security, Physical
Security, Emanations Security, and Network Security, the
instruction only address the areas of Information Security and
AlS/Computer Security. The remaining areas are covered under
other directives. In addition, SECNAVINST 5239.2 assigns
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overall responsibility of the Navy' s AIS Security Program to
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management.
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is charged with implementing
the AIS Security Program which has been delegated down to the
activity level at which an ADP Officer is designated to
administer the program. The ADP Officer report directly to the
commanding officer on AIS security matters. Figure 4.1




Figure A . 1 DON Organization
The AIS Security program has been segmented into several
parts with CNO delegating authority to subornate commands for
different aspects of the program. Commander, Naval Data
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Automation Command (COMNAVDAC) has been designated the Office
of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for Mission Support/NON-
Research, Development and Acquisition for the Security Program
and tasked with the development and management of the
Department of the Navy' s AIS Security Training Plan, which
includes promulgation of training guidance Navy wide. Other
commands involved in the AIS Security Program in the Navy are:
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
(COMSPAWARSYSCOM) , Commander, Naval Security Group Command
(COMNAVSECGRU) , Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command
(COMNAVTELCOM) , Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
(COMNAVINTCOM) , Commander, Naval Investigative Service Command
(COMNISCOM) , and Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
.
In March of 1991, the Secretary of the Navy drafted a
notice (SECNAVNOTE 5239.2) to all ships and stations
concerning the Department of the Navy Computer Security
Incident Program. As defined in the notice, the Navy Computer
Incident Program (NAVCIP) mission is to protect the Navy's
AISs, networks and computer resources from computer incidents.
The program receives and analyzes incident reports to
determine the correct countermeasures against the threat to
minimize damage to the Navy AISs. All Navy activities are
required to comply with this notice with the exception of
COMNAVSECGRU and COMNAVINTCOM who have their own incident
programs. The notice directs all Navy activities to report
their computer incidents to and receive guidance from the
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Naval Electronic Systems Security Engineering Center
(NAVELEXSECCEN) . SECNAVNOTE 523 9.2 defines a computer incident
in the following manner:
"An event that has actual or potential adverse effects on
computer or network operations involving fraud, waste,
or abuse; compromise of information; or loss or damage
of property or information"
.
A few examples of such incidents are unauthorized
penetration of a computer system, introduction of a computer
virus, or introduction of any other form of destructive code.
NAVELEXSECCEN is designated by the notice to act as the focal
point for computer incidents and therefore provided with the
authority to establish a Navy Computer Incident Response Team
(NAVCIRT)
.
This notice also recaps some of the previous information
on the security of AISs mentioned in DODINST 5200.28 and
SECNAVINST 523 9.2.
The Naval Computer Incident Response Team provide ADP
Officers located at Navy activities with a point of contact
for reporting and seeking technical guidance concerning
computer incidents on AISs. When an incident occurs in the
form of penetration, intrusions or introduction of malicious
code on Navy AISs, the NAVCIRT will forward an anti-viral
assistance package containing (1) information about NAVCIRT
and its services, (2) an anti-viral software package including
the IBM VIRPROD 2.1.2 which is licensed for use by the Navy,
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and (3) a questionnaire with basic information about the virus
or the malicious code.
The Naval Electronic Systems Security Engineering Center,
Washington DC has produced a draft of an instruction titled
"Guidelines for Activity Computer Security Incident Response
Plan (NAVSOPUB 5239.X)". The purpose of this instruction is to
provide information needed by DON activities to prepare for,
respond to, and report on computer security incidents. It also
provides some insight on effective countermeasures and
safeguards that can be employed to help the user minimize
damage that results from security incidents. Chapter I of this
instruction (NAVSOPUB 5239. X) involves a brief introduction
stating that the motivation behind the instruction is to
protect DON Automated Information Systems from data
modification, unauthorized disclosure, and service denial
hazards. The introductory chapter also states that with the
widespread availability of low-cost computers, surfaced new
threats of computer "hacker" penetration, technical
vulnerabilities, and malicious software such as viruses.
Subsequent chapters of this instruction provide more
detailed information to the user concerning computer security
incidents and focuses on a "Response Plan Strategy" . Response
Plan Strategy consist of Computer Security Awareness,
Effective Countermeasures, Comprehensive Safeguards, and
Preplanned Security Incident Response Actions which are
summarized below [Ref .26]
:
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Computer Security Awareness assumes that widespread use
of computer systems will virtually assure that security
incidents will take place at some point in time and
therefore asserts that computer security must be
instilled throughout the activity. The manager,
operators, and users must know what constitute a computer
security incident and take the appropriate steps when an
incidents occurs.
• Effective Countermeasures need to be implemented and
continually evaluated or assessed for their
effectiveness. These procedures must be able to adapt
to changes in threat situation without the
countermeasures themselves being constantly revised.
Comprehensive Safeguards can provide protection against
most computer security incidents if properly used.
However improperly used safeguards can be easily by-
passed. Safeguard diagnostics and companion "check and
balance" tools should be used to check the validity of
the safeguard mechanisms to ensure they are not defeated.
Preplanned Security Incident Response Actions are used to
test people in a realistic environment to ultimately
determine how effective is an activity in responding to
a computer incident. Training.
NAVSOPUB 5239.X also provides a description of general
responsibilities for functional users, Terminal Area Security
Officers (TASO) , Automated Data Processing System Security
Officer (ADPSSO) , Automated Data processing Security Officer
(ADPSO) , Activity Commanding Officers, Software Support
Activities (SSA) , and the Naval Computer Incident Response
Team (NAVCIRT) . It also provides guidelines to be
followed/implemented by activities regarding computer security
incidents. The instruction also states that "All individuals
who use, access, operate, maintain, or manage DON AIS
activities have the personal responsibility for complying with
established computer security practices, procedures, and
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policies. This includes exercising vigilance and surveillance
over not only your own actions, but also those of others,
which might compromise sensitive or classified information,
lead to information integrity loss, or result in unauthorized
service denial.".
NAVSOPUB 5239.X contains incident reporting procedures
which specifically directs all DON activities and their
contractors to report computer security incidents and await
guidance from NAVELEXSECCEN. Incidents whose suspected source
lie outside the Internet and Milnet should be reported to
NAVELEXSECCEN within 6 hours of discovery by phone or priority
Naval message. Other incidents should be reported within one
week to NAVELEXSECCEN via the appropriate chain-of-command
using the format in Appendix C of the instruction. NAVSOPUB
5239.X also provides an overview of viruses and worms in
Appendix A as a quick reference guide for the user, and
includes several examples of the types of viruses/worms found
on IBM PCs. Appendix A also includes procedures for
safeguarding systems from virus attacks. Appendix B provides
information on unauthorized malicious individuals (hackers)
attempting to gain access to computer systems. General
information is provided about hackers, what motivates them to
break into computer systems and how to prevent these
individuals from gaining access. Techniques such as password
management, auditing, and warning banners are methods explored
in the appendix to assist managers and user of DON AISs.
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The present organizational structure as indicated in
SECNAVINST 5239.2 places responsibility of AIS security in the
hands of several Navy organizations. Although this arrangement
may be effective in dealing with AIS security, however, a more
centralized structure will enable the users of AISs to
interact with one command for guidance and training on AISs
Security matters
.
A centralized organization will place the overall
responsibilty of AIS Security in the hands of one organization
for developing policy, training, and coordination efforts to
strengthen the Navy's AIS Security posture. This organization
will also reduce the need for each of the previous
organizations under the existing structure to produce there
own individual AIS Security instructions and policies.
In addition, the responsible organization for Navy AIS
Security should also be responsible for managing the Navy's
Computer Incident Program (NAVCIP)
.
On AIS Security issues involving the Intelligence
community, COMNAVINTCOM and COMNAVSECGRU would be able to
coordinate their efforts with the organization responsible for
the overall AIS Security program, reporting their incidents
and receiving guidance on AIS security.
NRL should be removed from the present structure and
research involving AIS Security should be conducted locally by
the designated command for the Navy's AIS Security program.
COMNISCOM would continue to receive tasking for investigating
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computer security incidents, however, tasking would come
directly from the organization responsible for the AIS
Security program.
B. OTHER PERTINENT GUIDANCE
The Communication-Computer Systems Security Vulnerability
Reporting Program (CVRP) was designed by the Air Force
Cryptologic Support Center (AFCSC) . This is comprehensive
program combining administrative controls, reporting
procedures, specially developed software, research and
development efforts, and special survey and analysis
capabilities to identify and develop countermeasures for Air
force communications-computer systems. CVRP also conducts
security risk analysis to identify vulnerabilities in Air
Force communication-computer systems. The program establishes
a single office to identify and validate the threat to Air
Force computer systems. An integral part of CVRP are lessons
learned from the analysis of the most recent communication and
computer security incidents. CVRP evaluates the threat and
security of the following environments: Sensitive Unclassified
Systems, Connectivity of Computers and Networks, Simple
Hacking Techniques, Poor User Discipline, Poor System Manager
Discipline, Operating System Vulnerabilities, Security
Monitoring, Security Incident Procedures, Tracing of Illegal
On-Line Activities, Tempest and Other Issues.
36
CVRP is a threat-driven program with primary emphasis on
Computer Security (COMPUSEC) involving all levels within the
Air Force and several external agencies and organizations.
Unlike NAVCIRP, CVRP deals with the intelligence community on
a regular basis.
In the CVRP, the Air Force has developed a risk model to
assist in developing countermeasures against confirmed risks.
According to this model, a risk must have three parts: (1)
there must be a confirmed vulnerability of the system in
question, (2) the sensitivity of the material will determine
the risk and (3) there must exist a validated threat to a
system before risk exists.
An important aspect of the program is the CVRP Process
which involves the collection and analysis of three types of
information. The first type of information is data collected
on each accredited Air Force computer system to uniquely
identify the system, the key personnel for security of the
system, and pertinent technical and environmental information.
This data is used to handle security incidents that may have
an impact throughout the Air Force and is maintained in the
accreditation data base. The second type is vulnerability
information received from analysis performed on Air Force
computer systems and stored in data base called vulnerability.
The third type of information is data collected on the threat
and is stored in a threat data base.
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The Electronic Security Survey Teams are the primary
source of on-site vulnerability analysis and security posture
evaluation of Air Force computer systems. There mission is to
assess the overall electronic security posture of an
organization
.
CVRP has designated the Air Force Cryptologic Support
Center (AFCSC) as the central point of coordination for
handling of communication-computer systems security incidents
to include hacking incidents and virus outbreaks.
The Air Force Incident Reporting Procedure (IRP) is a
separate program from CVRP which provides specific guidance on
the handling of computer security incidents. Head Quarters Air
Force has also directed AFCSC to manage this program. The IRP
requires that Air Force organizations operating communication-
computer systems regardless of size (mainframes, mini or
microcomputers), type, or use, will report computer incidents
to AFCSC via their chain-of-command. Incident reports can be
transmitted by phone, letter or message. Incident reports will
also be forwarded to National Information Security Assessment
Center (NISAC) and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigation (AFOSI) . The IRP also contains detailed







Figure 4 . 2 Air Force Organization
Figure 4.2 illustrates the current organization in the Air
Force for computer security which includes the following
commands: Headquarters U.S. Air Force (HQ, USAF)
r
Headquarters
Air Force Communications Command (HQ, AFCC) , Air Force Office




This centralized approach taken by the Air Force regarding
AIS Security enables the user to contact and receive guidance
from one command (AFCSC) . Although each command in the Air
Force may have their own local instructions regarding AIS
Security, AFCSC is the sole source in the Air Force for
implementing the AIS Security policy, training users, and
issuing guidance on issues involving AIS Security.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first four chapters attempted to illustrate the
growing threat of computer viruses and its potential impact on
AISs in the Department of the Navy. This was conducted by
providing detailed insight on both past and present
information on the threat imposed by computer viruses which
includes a brief history, various types of viruses,
classification methods, actual cases where viruses caused
destructive damage to computer resources, and pertinent
instructions in DOD and DON requiring the establishment of
security programs to protect AISs from this increasing threat.
The primary research question is to identify the security
threat from computer viruses. The purpose of this thesis is to
emphasize the need to safeguard information and computer
resources from the increasing threat of computer viruses.
A. ESTABLISHING A CENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION
As indicated in previous chapters, the virus threat is
disrupting computer systems and damaging information at an
alarming rate. Some virus experts believe that by the year
2000, there will be several thousands computer viruses active
in the computing environment. Following the November 1988
attack of the Internet Worm, the DoD formed an after-action
assessment team in which one of the recommendations to reduce
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the vulnerability of the government computer systems from
attack by viruses was to "establish a centralized
coordination" center supported jointly by National Institute
of Standards Technology (NIST) and National Security Agency
(NSA) . This center will be tasked as a clearinghouse and
repository for virus attacks [Ref.15]. The recommendation
called for this coordination to be a national level command
whereby computer center personnel can report problems to the
center and get solutions in return [Ref.15]
.
In order to best combat the virus threat, the Navy should
be organized similar to the Air Force whereby there is one
organization (AFCSC) which manages the entire Air Force's
communications and computer security programs. This will
enable organizations within the Navy to interact with only one
organization when dealing with AISs security issues involving
computer viruses
.
Presently, outlined in the SECNAVINST 5239.2, several
commands within the Navy have been given authority to manage
different aspects of the AIS Security Program.
B. VIRUS PROTECTION
Over the years, the threat of computer viruses has
escalated dramatically, requiring more emphasis on security
planning of virus prevention/protection for computer systems.
A sound security program should effectively deal with the
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threat of viruses and must address the following areas
[Ref .23]
:
• Comprehensive security policies covering all types of
computing (mainframes, personal computers, outside
sources)
.
• Ensure those computing resources requiring the highest
level of protection have been identified.
• Assess the risk of viruses to computing resources and take
effective measures to reduce the risk.
• Assign responsibility for the security program.
- Ensure contingency plans address computer viruses.
Below are three methods of virus protection which are
useful in protecting computer resources from attack.
1 . Safe Operating Procedures
Viruses are normally contracted from programs listed
on bulletin boards, programs borrowed from friends or software
libraries and free evaluation software [Ref. 31]. Users and
operators should refrain from using these sources. If it
becomes necessary to use one of the above sources, quarantine
the machine first before running the suspected program.
Subsequently, review the C0MMAND.COM, IBMBI0.COM and
IBMD0S.COM files to see if they were altered. There should
standard guidelines similar to the ones presented in appendix
C to assist users in computer virus protection [Ref. 3].
2 . Antiviral Programs and Utilities
Preventing entry into RAM and minimizing the damage
should the virus successfully enter memory are the functions
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of antiviral products. There are over 50 vaccines on the
market today to protect systems against viruses. These
vaccines fall into three distinct classes. The first class
consist of the "infection-prevention programs" which has been
successful eliminating 75 percent of the viruses [Ref.15].
The second class is "infection-detection programs which alerts
the operator when a virus enters the system [Ref.15] . They
generally locate the specific area of the system that has been
infected. The third class is the "infection identification and
removal programs" which identify and neutralize certain known
viruses [Ref.15] . They are only effective against virus they
recognize and cannot defend against unforeseen strains.
BOMBSQUAD by Andy Hopkins and C-4 by Interpath are examples of
virus protection software. BOMBSQUAD remains RAM resident and
monitors all calls to the BIOS. It then displays the
consequences of the call and prompts the user with a question.
C-4 is also a RAM resident antiviral program which monitors
for virus activity such as writes to executable files or
modifications to systems files and notifies the operator of
unusual activity [Ref.3].
Vaccines are either internal or external . Internal
vaccines attach verification code to each program, occupy
minimal RAM space and use no interrupts. The advantage of
internal vaccines is that they are the only type of vaccine
that protects servers. Internal vaccines may also detect
viruses that have eluded external file-checking procedures.
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External vaccines are the most common and combine vaccine
technology with a RAM-resident checker. They use less disk
space and consume more RAM space [Ref.15]
.
The "File-checking" vaccines are the most transparent
and comprehensive antiviral software packages on the market.
They operate by creating a signature on each program for
verification purposes and then warn the user of changes which
have occured [Ref.15]
.
When using vaccine products, users are caution that
few vaccines perform as promised and some have been known to
disrupt systems or destroy data. The majority of the products
on the market work only on certain brands of computers running
specific applications [Ref.15]. Users need to test each
vaccine that they acquire to ensure that its works in the
user's environment with the hardware, operating system, and
combination of software [Ref.15] . Although the user may assume
that the system is protected by antiviral software, the system
is still vulnerable to any new viruses that might be
developed.
3 . User/Operator Training
In order for a security program to succeed, the users
and operators must receive the proper training to prevent
computer viruses from invading their computer systems. The
training should be thorough enough to provide users of AISs
with the fundamental knowledge on how to recognize if a
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computer virus has invaded their system and what action or
procedures to follow to eradicate the virus. Each department
or organization should have in place a computer security
manager or administrator to provide users/operators with
knowledge of the technical tools available to detect and
respond to a computer virus attack [Ref.23] (Appendices A, B,
and C are useful guidelines to assist users of AISs in dealing
with the threat of computer viruses) .
There is no absolute way to prevent all computer
viruses from entering computer systems. However, following
some of the techniques mentioned in this thesis will aid in
minimizing the overall impact of viruses on Automated
Information Systems (AISs) in the Department of the Navy.
Viruses will continue to be a problem until software is
designed from the bottom up with security in mind.
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APPENDIX A DETECTION OF PC BASED VIRUSES
A. VIRUS DETECTION
Often, while a computer system is in operation, a virus
may have penetrated the operating system and the user could be
totally unaware of it. There are numerous types of computer
viruses and each are unique in their own way. Although some
viruses are quite sophisticated, most are not and they can be
easily detected. The user or operator should be alert to any
unusual activities that may be happening within the computer
systems operation. These unusual activities could be a sign
that a virus has invaded the system.
There are several ways a computer user can detect if a
virus has infected his or her system. The following are just
a few warning signals that a virus has invaded a computer
system [Ref . 13]
:
• a useful indicator is the number of files on the disk has
increased. A user should obtain a printout of files on the
disk' s directory and keep it handy while working with the
computer system. Occasionally, use the DIR command and
check to see if the number files has increased, if so,
this might be an indication that a virus may have invaded
the system.
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If you receive a message on the screen "1 File(s) copied"
and no copy command was invoked via a .BAT file or any
other procedure, there is a strong possibility that a
virus is in the system. Also, if your RAM space in your
system suddenly becomes smaller, use the CHKDSK command in
the operating system or any special utility to make note
of the RAM being used by the system. If you see a decrease
in the RAM available in the system, terminate and follow
any established organizational anti-virus procedures to
remove the virus from your system.
Bad clusters on a disk could signal a possible virus
infection. Often, disks are received from the vendor
with some defective clusters and should be noted.
However, if all of a sudden you encounter some
additional bad clusters, obtain a map of the hard disk
using utility programs such as Norton Utilities or PC
tools. Periodically compare the map with your list of
bad sectors to guard against a possible virus.
A change in the size of an executable program is also a
typical a virus indicator. Do not execute this program
until you have thoroughly examined the program by
comparing the code from an original disk.
• Programs taking significantly long time to load could be
attributed to a virus infection. Terminate what you are
doing and run a system diagnostic test to check for any
problems
.
* If you determine that a file's date and time stamp has
changed and cannot attribute this change to anything you
may have done could be the result of a virus in the
system.
• llumination of a disk drive light when the disk is not
being accessed for read or write during current operations
could indicate a virus is present (although this could
also result default light for the hard disk "C") . An
investigation will need to be conducted to determine the
cause of the problem.
* A noticeable increased in the access time of a hard disk
could indicate a virus although in most cases a faulty or
severely fragmented hard disk is the problem. Activate
hard disk diaanostics to determine the exact cause.
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* Failure of a hard disk to boot the system could mean that
the master boot record, partition table or file allocation
table have been altered or destroyed. Run hard disk
diagnostics to reveal the problem.
• A noticeable increase in the execution time of a program
often indicates that a virus has attached itself to the
program. Terminate execution of the program and check the
program code against the original program.
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APPENDIX B TREATMENT OF PC BASED VIRUSES
A. TREATMENT OF COMPUTER VIRUSES
One of the most difficult tasks is removing a computer
virus after it has penetrated the boundaries of the computer
system. Some viruses are designed to invade the operating
system of the computer and remain hidden until certain
conditions take place before emerging. There is practically
nothing you can do about these viruses since you may not even
know this virus is in your system. However, most other type of
viruses can be removed by running a diagnostic program and
following the steps below [Ref.16]:
• Power down all system components.
• Disconnect battery power to memory and wait 10 to 20
seconds. Disconnect the hard disk from the system and boot
the system from a new, clean and write protected floppy
disk
.
• Have the system run a diagnostic formatter for the hard
disk on system boot-up.
• Power down the system then reconnect the hard disk.
• Power up the system and reformat the hard drive.
• Initialized the hard drive and create system-loadable
modules on the hard drive
.
- Re-boot from the hard drive and run virus-checking
software from a write-protected floppy to ensure that the
hard drive is virus free.
• Back up the hard drive completely in order to archive a
clean system configuration.
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- Restore applications from the original write-protected
distribution disks.
• Run another virus check to ensure things are okay and
then back up system again.
The procedure above is a generic procedure to clean a
system once it has been infected. There are several new
anti-viral products on the market that also can be helpful in
guarding against and removing viruses from computers.
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APPENDIX C PREVENTION OF PC BASED VIRUSES
A. VIRUS PREVENTION
With the rapid growth of computer viruses over the past
few years and the damage that can cause, the need for
effective virus prevention techniques is imperative. Virus
prevention is the most important aspect of all anti virus
techniques. This should be obvious since the goal is to
prevent computer viruses from ever penetrating a system in the
first place. Preventive methods are not foolproof and will not
prevent all computer viruses from invading a system. However,
most viruses will be foiled if the user strictly adheres to
anti-virus procedures. The best way to prevent computer
viruses from infecting a system is to raise the
conscientiousness of users and educate them in safe operating
procedures
.
A few of the simplest, yet most effective, ways a user or
operator can be successful in preventing viruses from invading
computer systems are outlined below [Ref.14]
:
• Do not use unknown software such as shareware, software
from bulletin boards, or bootlegged software. Use software
from a known vendor.
- Have a centralized list of software and vendors to prevent
or deter the purchasing of unknown software.
" Use a write tab on suspect disks. If a virus exists, the
computer will responded with a write access error.
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• Educate employees in the dangers posed by viruses and
instruct them not to upload any unknown software on their
system (viruses cannot spread if they are not given the
opportunity)
.
• Make all .EXE and .COM files on personal computers read
only. This will prevent any unauthorized access.
• When using swap tapes, recompile source programs after
checking the code (source and object may contain different
information)
• Decompile new programs and check for suspect DOS calls
before running these new applications.
• Change commonly used system passwords. Viruses have been
know to gain access to computer systems by checking some
of the most commonly used passwords.
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